



Megaron

<https://megaron.yildiz.edu.tr> - <https://megaronjournal.com>
DOI: <https://doi.org/10.14744/megaron.2024.87846>

MEGARON

Article

Diverse geographies of urban crisis: A comparative analysis of Egypt, India and Türkiye

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ARTICLE INFO

Article history

Received: 25 October 2023

Revised: 24 April 2024

Accepted: 25 April 2024

Key words:

Comparative analysis; global south; Türkiye; urban crises; urban policies.

ABSTRACT

The article concentrates on the reasons behind, and consequences of, the post-2008 urban crises experienced in the southern geographies of capitalism. It does so through a comparative analysis of three cases, namely India, Egypt, and Türkiye. The methodological approach in the article attempts to expand the scope of urban politics research to bring divergent cases into conversation. We argue that loosely defined, similar and different causes and/or repeated outcomes of urban crises across diverse cases could form an appropriate base for research in urban politics. The article brings the politics of redistribution in three cases/countries under the spotlight, focusing on four dimensions of the politics of redistribution: (dis)possession; exploitation; commons; and representation. While the last two dimensions dominated the scene in Egypt, in the case of Türkiye, it was about the politics of representation and exploitation. In India, the politics of (dis)possession and commons seem to constitute the center of urban politics. Furthermore, as the comparative analysis of the countries reveals, the role of the state and its historical and spatial configurations have played a strategic role in the formation of the politics of distribution. The comparative analysis also indicates that the variegated neoliberal urban policies have become successful or have failed in containing urban crises. The reasons for the success/failure in urban policies depend on three major factors: (1) the spatio-institutional design of the urban policy-making mechanisms; (2) the historical pattern of urbanization; (3) the role of the nation-state, especially the central government, in the politics of redistribution.

Cite this article as: Penpecioglu, M., Bayirbag, M. K. (2024). Diverse geographies of urban crisis: A comparative analysis of Egypt, India and Türkiye. *Megaron*, 19(2), 219–230.

INTRODUCTION

The Urban Crisis and Its Diverse Geographies Under Spotlight

The post-2008 waves of economic crises have mainly manifested themselves in major urban centers of different countries across the world. Various economic and social

problems, such as unemployment, low wages, austerity policies, precarious work, and exclusion, observed dramatically in cities, gained an urban character in time and were called an “urban crisis” by many researchers (Bayirbag & Penpecioglu, 2017; Martí-Costa & Tomàs, 2017; Arampatzi, 2017; Barbehön & Münch, 2017; Hinkley, 2017).

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Published by Yıldız Technical University, İstanbul, Türkiye

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In our previous study (Bayırbağ & Penpecioglu, 2017), we clearly defined “urban crisis” as the remarkable outcome of government policies. Urban crisis has become a political phenomenon when neoliberal policies (“containment strategies”) fail to keep socio-economic inequalities under control; thus, there is a need to look at the relationship between two different dimensions of urban crises: (1) their root causes in the longer past and (2) the containment strategies employed by the governments to manage socio-economic inequalities. The purpose of the article is to briefly explicate these two dimensions of urban crisis within an initial and limited framework of comparative analysis.

The urban crisis has now become a global phenomenon and it has exploded in diverse urban geographies ranging from the global North to the global South. As a country having diverse characteristics from both the global North and South, Türkiye inevitably suffers from urban crisis, particularly as observed in the last decade. Regarding the diverse countries of urban crisis, there are key questions that remain to be answered: Are there any significant differences between the instances of urban crisis in diverse urban geographies across the world? What are the main characteristics of urban crises in the selected countries of the global South? Urban crisis in Türkiye manifests what kind of similarities and differences compared to the countries of the global South? What is the meaning of these similarities and differences in terms of comparative urban politics? In this article, we propose some initial and limited answers to these wide-comprehensive research questions by drawing on a comparative analysis of India, Egypt, and Türkiye.

Why is a comparative analysis of urban crisis regarding the geographies/countries of the global South significant for the purpose of this paper? There are mainly two reasons. Firstly, although the global economic crisis of 2008 hit almost every country across the world, it has been quite visible and deep in some less-developed southern geographies/countries of the world (including some countries of the global South, such as Brazil, Chile, Egypt, Morocco, etc., and some less-developed countries of the EU, like Greece and Spain). Moreover, most of the protests/riots in those countries have been violently repressed by the state. Secondly, the socio-economic transformation experienced in those southern geographies/countries has been fast-paced, and this transformation has come in the form of a new and rapid wave of neoliberal urbanization, which exacerbated dispossession, uneven development, and alienation. Therefore, concentrating on those southern cases of urban crisis could provide further insights into the geographical organization of global neoliberal capitalism.

The article puts forward a comparative research based on three country cases: India, Egypt, and Türkiye. Although the cases of India and Egypt draw on a comprehensive

analysis of secondary resources (literature reviews), the case of Türkiye is based on an international academic research project completed in 2020 and funded by the British Academy. Diverse findings from the first and secondary resources were elaborated meticulously and gathered within a comparative analytical framework.

MATERIALS AND METHODS

Thinking Urban Policies with Elsewhere: An Initial Step for A Comparative Methodological Framework of Analysis

The urban could be theorized as a “concrete totality” by Lefebvre (2003; 1996) that could provide an essential base for comparative imagination and conceptual innovation. Following the main theoretical-methodological line of Lefebvre, Robinson (2022; 2016a; 2016b) recently put forward an alternative comparative methodological framework to investigate diverse cases in the field of urban politics. According to Robinson (2016a), many studies in urban politics have confronted challenging methodological problems. Some of these problems in comparative research could be summarized as follows: framing a case as a particular or pre-given entity, an over-focus on similar socio-economic causes of the cases, the ignorance of both the socio-cultural differences and the historical backgrounds in the cases, and limiting research to some similar cities having resembled socio-political contexts based on the global North.

Building an initial methodological step/framework for a comparative analysis in urban politics is a challenging scientific task. Robinson (2016b), Deville et al. (2016), and Jacobs (2012) have all attempted to provide an alternative framework for comparative analysis, which allows analytical reach across difference and diversity, expanding the scope of the research to bring divergent cases into conversation. We argue that loosely defined similar and different causes and/or repeated outcomes of urban crisis across diverse cases could form an appropriate base for research in urban policy. Robinson (2022), in her recent book, conceptualizes this “reformatted comparative methodological approach” as “thinking with elsewhere,” meaning that starting to think about urban policy anywhere should be in conversation with the multiple elsewheres of any other urban policies in a different country/geography across the globe.

In other words, in diverse countries/geographies of neoliberal capitalism, there are prolific circulating processes and dramatic interconnections regarding the crisis of neoliberal urban policies. These processes and connections draw us to think across different cases of urban policies, which entail a comparative framework of analysis. Tracing these, the field of urban policies could be thought of as composed of a multiplicity of differentiated (repeated) outcomes of urban crisis, which are closely interconnected

through a range of transnational processes and are part of repeated-but-differentiated formations within wider circulations and circuits of urbanization and globalization (Robinson, 2022). To this end, based on Robinson's (2022; 2016a; 2016b) methodological formulation of "thinking with elsewhere," our article attempts to build an initial step for a comparative methodological approach to investigate diverse cases of urban crisis. In the article, we comparatively analyze three significant cases: Egypt and India from the global South and Türkiye as a geography/country of transition between the North and South.

There are five main reasons behind the selection of the three cases, Egypt, India, and Türkiye. First, in all cases, the nation-state has played a historical and central role in the construction of a capitalist market economy (Keyder, 2022; Bayırbağ, 2013a). Second, ethnic/religious diversity is a common ground for all three cases, and at least in the cases of Egypt and Türkiye, not only the historical paths of their political-economic development but also the cultural fabric of their societies (especially the role and place of religion in social life) are quite similar in many regards (Tuğal, 2012). Third, all these countries are characterized by deep social and geographical inequalities, which have worsened during their increasing integration with the global market economy. Revealing the reasons and consequences of inequalities in the urbanization processes requires an in-depth analysis of the role of informality in the context of neoliberal economic relations and politics (Roy, 2009; Roy, 2005; Alsayyad, 2004). Fourth, despite the above-mentioned similarities, the urban protests and social resistance movements in these countries have taken quite different forms. While the Egyptian case resulted in the downfall of the political establishment, the protests in Türkiye seem to have created an atmosphere of political alertness, without causing a major change in political balances (Bayırbağ & Penpecioglu, 2017). The case of India, however, seems to portray a quite different picture. In India, one does not come across widespread urban protests targeting the political regime, even though there are stark social and geographical inequalities produced by the neoliberal urbanization processes (Roy, 2011). Thus, the containment strategies employed by the public authorities in India seem to work rather efficiently, keeping the political scene under control. Finally, regarding the depth and diversity of the relevant literature, these three cases have recently drawn the attention of the broader public and academics, fueling quite productive scholarly debates challenging the established interpretations of urban politics under neoliberalism.

Through a critical review of the key secondary sources (articles, chapters) on cities of the global South (Alsayyad & Roy, 2004; Roy, 2005; Roy, 2009; 2011; Schindler, 2013b; Schindler, 2017; Soliman, 2004; Sharp, 2022; Tuğal, 2012) and building on our previous theoretical arguments on urban politics in Türkiye (Bayırbağ, 2013a; Bayırbağ

& Penpecioglu, 2017; Bayırbağ et al., 2022), we have identified four main contested axes of urban politics to make a comparative analysis. These four main axes are: (1) Politics of Possession/Dispossession (resources exploited to produce material wealth, such as land, labor, and capital); (2) Politics of Exploitation (surplus value produced through the exploitation of these resources); (3) Politics of Commons (publicly owned, controlled, and redistributed common wealth); (4) Politics of Representation (sites of decision-making that shape the functioning of the above spheres of redistribution and political struggle).

These four dimensions are not ontologically isolated categories; rather, they constitute the main contours of the comparative analysis of urban crisis. These dimensions could also be seen as a framework of the key issues/concerns examined by the literature concentrating on the dramatic and fast-paced story of neoliberal urbanization in three cases. The article reveals that those different dimensions of urban politics come to the fore in different combinations in diverse countries and thus shape the form of urban crises in these countries/cases. To be more specific, while in the case of Egypt, the politics of commons and representation dominated the scene, in the case of Türkiye, it was about the politics of representation and exploitation. In the case of India, the politics of possession/dispossession and commons seem to constitute the core of the main conflicts and struggles in urban politics.

DISCUSSION I

The Role of The States in Crisis-Prone Neoliberal Urbanization Processes

To reiterate one of our key arguments, urban crises are publicly recognized when the strategies employed by the state fail to contain the structural dynamics that lay the grounds for urban protests and oppositional movements (Bayırbağ & Penpecioglu, 2017). Hence, the scope of our research framework will remain incomplete if we do not ask questions about the role played by the state. By this, we mean explicating the relationship between the evolution of the spatio-political configuration of a state, as well as its intervention strategies to economy/society (Brenner, 2004; Jessop, 1990) and the historical pattern of urbanization in a country.

In the countries from the southern geographies of the world, it might be argued that nation-state building has been the major political concern shaping the institutionalization process of capitalism there, especially given that most of those countries are post-colonial. Nation-state building in the South is, no doubt, an unfinished business. This is especially so for the spatio-political configuration of the nation-states in the Middle East (Alsayyad & Roy, 2004). We think that this observation also resonates with the case of India, given its post-colonial history.

After colonial periods, when nation-building is a central concern, economic policies aiming to institute a national market economy had to be backed up by an official discourse of social cohesion (Türel & Altun, 2013), emphasizing the need for redistributive public policies (Bayırbağ, 2013a). The question of redistribution, thus, has always constituted an important axis of political struggles at the national and local scales for decades to come after independence (Tuğal, 2012; Veltmeyer, 2011; Sharma, 2011; Brumberg, 1992).

In the above regards, a transition to neoliberal policies would inevitably put the legitimacy and integrity of the national political regimes in those countries to the test. In the case of India, for example, Shatkin (2014) outlines the key tensions resulting from this transition: “Between the egalitarian ethos inherited from traditions of socialism and Gandhian thinking, and the hard-driving utilitarianism of a globalizing business class; between the pluralist nature of Indian democracy, and the allure of authoritarian models of urban governance; between the modernist vision of a globally connected class, and the daily incursions on the planned order of the city by the poor.” While the cases of Egypt and Türkiye also suffer from the first and last tensions, the second one is not directly relevant to those two cases. This is mainly because of the history of authoritarianism in Egypt and Türkiye and the territorial configuration of their states.

The territorial configuration of the Indian state corresponds to its ethnic/religious/cultural/socio-economic diversity, finding its expression in its federal structure. For that reason, one is likely to come up with different modes of redistribution and different containment strategies across its territory, even if the country's transition to neoliberalism has been initiated by a strong central government (Sharma, 2011). The cases of Egypt and Türkiye display rather different characteristics. Being unitary states with relatively less heterogeneous populations, central governments in Egypt and Türkiye have dominated local governments and have tended to maintain direct control over urban policies.

In most cases of the global South, neoliberalization amounts to something different than the death of a past socio-political order that had provided its members with free, secure, and decent conditions for life. To the contrary, these conditions had already been missing (or incomplete) there. In that regard, for example, we find Roy's (2011) suggestion to employ the theoretical categories revolving around the notion of uncertainty (“peripheries,” “urban informality,” “zones of exception,” and “gray spaces”) to better examine urbanism practices. As Roy (2011) argues, the concept of informality is necessary to comprehend India's urbanization processes: “Urban informality is a heuristic device that uncovers the ever-shifting urban relationship between the legal and illegal, legitimate and illegitimate, authorized and unauthorized.”

Following Roy's emphasis on the ever-shifting set of relationships (McFarlane, 2012), we further argue that such countries have offered a more suitable environment for neoliberalization to take root faster than it would happen in the countries/geographies of the global North, where capitalism originated and developed over a long historical process. In contrast, the contemporary processes of neoliberal urbanization in the South have operated through the institutionalization of uncertainty, the legalization/formalization of (previously) illegal/informal urban conditions, or vice versa. This institutionalization process, however, serves to further deepen the socio-economic contradictions and faultlines besetting the nation-states in the South (Bayat, 2000), while the future of socio-economic and political change increasingly gains an “indeterminate” character (Shatkin, 2014; Stadnicki et al., 2014; Simone, 2014; Simone & Rao, 2012).

The geographies of uncertainty created by these socio-economic transformations, especially the territorial patterns of urbanization instigated by neoliberal policies, tend to vary across the cases. In the case of India, the neoliberal urbanization process moves in two different directions: (1) In-migration from the rural areas to major urban centers (Roy, 2011) and (2) speculative urban growth towards the urban-rural periphery (Goldman, 2011; Balakrishnan, 2013; Sami, 2013). Here, it should be noted that the former movement is not new. Yet, the neoliberal turn in economic policy (Sharma, 2011) and the subsequent administrative reform in 1992 have increased in-migration while also triggering urban growth (Shatkin, 2014). As we shall discuss in detail later, the in-migration processes in the country have created visible inter-class tensions revolving around the politics of commons.

The rate of increase in migration from rural to urban in Türkiye and Egypt began to slow down by the end of the 1990s, compared to India. (For Egypt, see Bayat & Denis, 2000; for Türkiye, see Işık & Pınarcıoğlu, 2002). Moreover, in both countries, neoliberal policy turns took place earlier, around the 1980s, and the neoliberalization process gained further momentum during the 1990s and 2000s (For both cases, see Tuğal, 2012; for Egypt, see Brumberg, 1992; for Türkiye, see Bayırbağ, 2013a; Türkün, 2011). Thus, urban classes have constituted those sections of their respective societies hardest hit by neoliberal policies in those countries (Simone & Rao, 2012; Bayat, 2000).

Here, it should be noted that the Egyptian state's powerful role in the economy, especially its strong grip over the production and distribution of national wealth, has long made publicly owned and controlled resources the center of the national political struggles (Brumberg, 1992). Hence, the anti-authoritarian protests in Egypt between 2011 and 2013 could also be seen as the expression of a now unbearable political pressure on the central government, created by the

gap between: (1) the heightened expectations from the state by an urban population left to the mercy of an emergent market economy, and (2) its increasingly undermined capacity to deliver public benefits equally. Thus, the politics of commons and representation played a more central role in the case of Egypt, and the protests have had long-term effects on the political processes in the country.

The picture Bayat (2004) portrays for Egypt has certain similarities with the case of Türkiye. The Gezi protests first started as an individual protest in Istanbul but then became a country-wide social unrest. Moreover, the proletarianization and precarization processes of the middle class have played an important role in fueling the Gezi protests (Bürkev, 2013; Boratav, 2013). Although 10 years have passed, the Gezi protests were the first sign of a broader crisis of social reproduction. However, at the same time, they apparently revealed that an oppositional social movement could develop against the urban-rent-based policies of the authoritarian Turkish government (Eraydın & Taşan-Kok, 2013; Kuymulu, 2013). In Türkiye, since the 1980s, urban land has turned into an enormous source of wealth and capital accumulation (Şengül, 2012; Şengül, 2009). On the one side, key actors in politics and real estate markets like property owners and developers, political agents, and investors possess the urban land/housing, and because of this possession, they receive huge benefits from these urban-rent-based policies (Ünsal & Türkün, 2014; Türkün, 2011; Dinçer, 2011). On the other side, as the housing crisis in Türkiye indicates, the low-income middle classes, poor and unemployed people, students, and other vulnerable groups have gradually found it increasingly difficult to buy a house or to afford the rents (Işık, 2022; Uzun, 2022; Türkün, 2014). In those regards, as the Gezi protests embarked on the first signs of crisis, we argue that the unsustainable politics of exploitation (of labor and land) has played a key role in the Turkish case (Enlil & Dinçer, 2022; Bayırbağ, 2013a).

To summarize, just like the Egyptian case, the Gezi protesters targeted an authoritarian government, and the urban protests were also about the politics of representation. The reason, however, was rather different as there has been no state around that distributed public benefits directly. The distribution of wealth in Türkiye has taken place via authoritarian interventions of the state into the labor and land markets, deepening the processes of exploitation. Moreover, the sites of representation targeted by the protesters during the Gezi protests also involved the municipal governments, and concerns with local/bottom-up democracy and equity came to the forefront after the protests (Bayırbağ, 2013b). With the 2019 local elections, all these demands for democracy and equity led to the change of political parties controlling municipal governments in most of the metropolitan cities (Savaşkan, 2021; Penpecioglu, 2019). So far, we have discussed the

underlying currents preparing the grounds for (potential) urban crises in our cases. Below, we will discuss how the containment strategies have worked and/or failed across those different cases, concentrating on the four dimensions of urban politics.

DISCUSSION II

The Diversified Urban Policies to Contain Urban Crisis

In this part of the article, we elaborate on the main question: How have diversified urban policies been formulated and implemented to contain urban crisis? By focusing on three significant cases, the article indicates the success and/or failure of these policies in containing urban crisis. The findings from the cases are discussed respectively.

The Case of India

For the reasons discussed earlier, the politics of possession/dispossession and the politics of commons come to the fore as the key axes of urban political struggles in India. Yet, the containment strategies in these domains seem to work relatively well in India.¹ To reiterate another point we raised earlier, a dispersed institutional landscape of political representation emerges as a key factor containing the likely discontent with neoliberal urbanization processes (Sami, 2013).

In this political landscape, the most dangerous segments of society (in terms of their political mobilization capacity and the resources they possess), such as “the small-scale enterprise owners,” “the new middle class,” and “the salaried workers in public and private sector enterprises,” are incorporated into the local governance structures, which have been institutionalized in cities like Delhi. This political empowerment of the middle class not only precludes any possibility of potential challenges to the neoliberal urban policies but also pits its membership against the expanding ranks of the urban poor in using the commons, especially in the use of public spaces, where the urban poor are forced to conduct their daily economic activities to earn their livelihood (Schindler, 2013a; Schindler, 2013b). This rivalry is not a zero-sum game, and there is a degree of interdependency between these two groups, where the former moves to regulate the presence (activities and circulation) of the latter, thereby performing a political control function over the urban poor (Schindler, 2013a).

Therefore, while the urban poor in India are also engaged with street politics via strategies of “silent encroachment” (in the form of social nonmovement) as in the case of Egypt (Bayat, 2010), this time their potential enemy and the target of their potential discontent with neoliberalism would not be the public institutions, but those different elements of the middle class. Yet, there is an interdependency, and the conflicts with the middle class are resolved, though

temporarily, via the informal negotiations between the citizens from the middle classes and the state. Besides, Schindler (2013a) also notes that members of the middle class do not always act as a common front, because part of its membership is cognizant of that interdependency.

Second, the dispersed institutional landscape of urban governance also opens some room for the urban poor to have access to public benefits, albeit via clientelist channels of representation. Here, the dispersed institutional landscape of urban governance also helps in containing the tensions generated by struggles revolving around access to public benefits. In this context, “the struggles and negotiations among these actors serve to establish the boundary between formal/informal, and this boundary is never permanently fixed, it is perpetually contested” (Schindler, 2013b). The blurred—and always changing—boundaries between the formal and the informal provide leverage to the powerful in containing the weak in the politics of commons (McFarlane, 2012; Roy, 2011; Roy, 2004; Schindler, 2013b). Yet, Bawa (2011) also notes that these blurred boundaries keep the poor’s hopes alive, allowing them, albeit negotiated, access to commons.

Our discussion on the politics of commons sheds light on the politics of possession/dispossession, too. The dispersed landscape of decision-making and the role played by informal channels of representation in urban governance are key to understanding the politics of possession/dispossession. The processes of dispossession of peasants/farmers in rural areas in India do not always occur by a top-down imposition of the capitalist forces (Doshi, 2011; Solomon, 2007). Peasants/farmers could engage in informal negotiations with state/public authorities, and these negotiations occur in three ways: personal networks of entrepreneurs (Sami, 2013), social networks/organizations (Balakrishnan, 2013), and political parties (Roy, 2004). As a result of these informal channels of representation/negotiations, the peasants/farmers could attempt to find opportunities to resist the process of dispossession or to receive some economic benefits from the state/public authorities.

To explain how uncertainty is institutionalized in the case of India’s urban politics, Solomon (2007; 2008) proposes the concept of “occupancy urbanism.” This atmosphere of uncertainty gives the urban poor political leverage in advancing their claims to possession and exploitation of land. His emphasis on “the plurality of land and law” and “the negotiated boundaries between the formal and the informal” (and between the legal and the illegal) is based upon a conception of “cities as open-ended spaces of politics,” where the public authorities seem to lose their central place in the analysis and the poor gain, by default, the status of agency (Roy, 2011). If we follow this line of reasoning, we could conclude that the poor could indeed

reap the benefits of neoliberal processes of urbanization. However, we should also note that urban politics in all developing countries do not always revolve around a “land-based economy.” Hence, this conclusion cannot be stretched to all developing countries and even to all Indian cities, given the uneven nature of capitalist economic development.

Regarding the politics of commons, it could be argued that contemporary urban policies of “climate change mitigation,” “waste management,” and “green policies of resilience” have been developed as a strategy of neoliberal crisis management. For instance, as both the cases of waste management in West Bengal (Blok, 2016) and urban resilience building in Surat (Cornea et al., 2016) indicate, large-scale urban change in India is not an easy business and is mostly challenged by the politics of urban commons. There are situated tools, practices, and knowledge in the government of such urban commons, and the resultant forms of urban crisis (like unjust urban transformation, climate injustice, and unsustainable forms of urban metabolism) have been shaped and contested around specific places, spaces, and cities in the country (Demaria & Schidler, 2016).

The dispersed scene of urban governance in India has been going through a process of centralization, where more power is now invested in the hands of the public authorities and bureaucrats. Those authorities could execute the urban development projects using different tactics, articulating with “class, gender, and ethno-religious identity” in different cases, with different results (Doshi, 2011). Besides, the politico-institutional infrastructure of urban governance is not that dispersed in every Indian city, as in the case of Calcutta under the rule of the Communist Party. Such coordinated/centralized urban governance scenes could make use of the informality of the status of land, both to give the poor increased access to land and to evict them from these lands as a result of neoliberal urban development practices (Roy, 2004; Yiftachel & Yakobi, 2004).

The Case of Egypt

As we argued earlier, the politics of commons and representation have constituted the major axes of political struggles leading to the urban crisis in Egypt. Below, we will further concentrate on the reasons why these two fields have come to the fore.

To reiterate, unlike the Indian case, the Egyptian state enjoys a monopoly over the policy-making process. Of course, this does not mean that it has developed a clear and consistent urban policy framework and did not directly regulate the processes of urbanization. Nevertheless, given the state’s central role in regulating the economy and in the production/distribution of socially produced wealth, the political regime constituted the target of the urban protests in 2011.

Just like India, uncertainty is the rule as long as one is concerned with the legal status of urban land, and the production process of housing is mostly informal in the Egyptian cities, where most of the population inhabits informally developed neighborhoods (called “Ashwaiyyat”). Soliman (2004) detects 22 different patterns of informal housing production (built on agricultural land, desert land, and public/private land) and identifies a diverse set of actors involved in this informal housing production. It could be argued that those negotiated boundaries between the informal and the formal, and between the legal and the illegal, have facilitated the housing production process. However, more importantly, this diversified pattern of housing production (and the range of actors involved) also suggests that it is hard to define one single axis/theme of confrontation between the suppliers and those who demand housing. In fact, as Soliman (2004) indicates, in certain instances, self-control mechanisms emerge among the poor, where the first wave of immigrants would move to establish controls over the late-comers, as the latter have settled on the lands occupied by the former first.

What is more, it is also hard to argue that, in Egypt, the neoliberal policies of the central government did have a clear reference to the urban space as the focus/locus of the capital accumulation process (unlike the cases of India and Türkiye), which would otherwise bring the dispossession process to the center of urban politics/governance.² In addition, just like the Indian case, we could talk about the existence of a dispersed scene of urban governance. Hence, at least, the discontent with neoliberalism could not be directed against a single local public institution. Nevertheless, the processes of neoliberal urbanization have definitely laid the grounds for urban protests, mainly around the politics of commons. As Bayat (2013) puts forward: “the Egyptian urban poor protested against the high price of food, especially bread, against the demolition of illegal homes, and the shortage of drinking water; Cairo’s garbage collectors waged a series of unprecedented collective protests, and the young got involved in civic activism and voluntary work on a scale seen never before” (Bayat, 2013). Stadnicki, et al. (2014) argues that the financial toll the neoliberal urbanization process took on the urban masses, and the public authorities’ capacity to deliver the services needed, contributed to fueling the protests in 2011.

The politics of representation constitute the second key dimension of the urban crisis in Egypt. Here, one may rush to conclude that the urban poor would constitute the natural riverbed for the formation of explosive political demands in that regard. The urban poor, however, have subscribed to the strategy of “silent encroachment” (Bayat, 2004; Bayat, 2000). If there has been a potential for political mobilization, this has been due to the organizational capacity of the religious groups, whose organizational base, according to Bayat (2007), was drawn from the “middle-

class over-achievers who have felt marginalized by the dominant economic, political, or cultural processes in their societies, those for whom the failure of both capitalist modernity and socialist utopia has made the language of morality (religion) a substitute for politics.” In other words, unlike the Indian case, this time, it was the middle class that confronted the state and challenged the neoliberal processes of urbanization. Bayat (2013), however, urges us not to over-emphasize the role of religion in the country-wide protests in 2011 while labeling it a non-religious and civil one.

After the military coup in 2013, military forces suppressed urban revolts and uprisings in Egypt. The new political regime has introduced new urban policies to contain urban crises in the last 10 years, and it has identified informally developed neighborhoods as a “threat” to the nation. However, as Sharp (2022) thoroughly explains in his article on Egypt’s urbanization, the new political regime’s attempt to eliminate informality has not resulted in greater control over the root causes and consequences of urban informality. Contrary to its aim, the new regime deepened the hazardization of urban life that exacerbates socio-spatial injustice and unsustainable development in the country.

The Case of Türkiye

The historical development of urban policies in Türkiye has varied over different periods. As urban crisis containment strategies, we propose to analyze these policies in line with four successive periods: (1) the background and the first rise of neoliberal urban policies (1950–1993); (2) local government policies as the base of urban crisis containment strategies (1994–2001); (3) the urban rent-based policies institutionalized as the driving force of urban crisis containment by the central government (2002–2012); and (4) the limits to neoliberal urbanization and the signs of the collapse in urban crisis containment (since 2013 and continuing).

In this article, we argue that the politics of representation and the politics of exploitation have constituted two key domains of political tensions in the case of Türkiye, which led to serious urban protests (known as the Gezi Park Protests that became countrywide events in 2013) and resurrected reactions and criticism (after the devastating Kahramanmaraş Earthquakes in 2023) against neoliberal urban policies in the last decade. Although the politics of commons and the politics of dispossession equally influenced both national and local politics (Firat, 2022; Hazar-Kalonya, 2021; Kuymulu, 2013), the findings in this article indicate that they have been contained through the operation of key neoliberal urban policies since 1994 (a key turning point after the local elections). However, in the last decade in Türkiye, there are urban protests, oppositional movements, and devastating disasters that are serious signs showing the collapse of these policies.

In Türkiye, policies of the post-1950 governments initiated the urbanization process, deepening the uneven development in the country while pouring labor power into the emerging metropolitan centers (emergence of urban poverty and squatter settlements). Coupled with the post-1960 Keynesian policies and especially during the 1970s, class-based political tensions began to dominate the scene. Alienation then was under check via social networks of the immigrants and the sense of rising class solidarity among the urban masses. Just before the military coup of 1980, a new neoliberal economic program (January 24 Decisions) was introduced to end Keynesianism. The subsequent neoliberal policies, especially during the 1980s and the associated state reforms, increasingly targeted the metropolitan areas through the “urbanization of capital,” while the associated economic policies and the political discourses promoted began to dissolve the solidarity networks, promoting individualization (Şengül, 2012).

The 1994 local elections were a turning point in the history of urban policies, not only because they changed the political parties controlling Metropolitan Municipalities (like Istanbul and Ankara), but also because it was a fundamental shift in the logic of urban crisis containment strategies. The new municipal governments ruled in Istanbul and Ankara between 1994 and 2002 introduced local social aid programs, stimulated urban transformation schemes, and developed mechanisms of generating and distributing urban rent (Bayırbağ, 2013a; Şengül, 2011). Via such policies, both in the formal and informal spheres, they sought to retain control of the rent/surplus generated by profit-driven urban transformation, which was distributed to a range of actors to engender broad-based political support. As one of the chief city planners who worked in this period explains, “Municipality increases building densities, politicians take their share, investors win more money, and the residents own new flats” (Bayırbağ et al., 2022). This is a typical neoliberal win-win game that took its roots from the municipal policies of the 1990s. While this neoliberal logic made urban rent a dominant phenomenon in the containment of the urban crisis, it also created temporary influences that kept social and class-based inequalities under control.³

The urban rent-based policies became the driving force of urban crisis containment between 2002 and 2012. In this period, the central government triggered a series of comprehensive policy reforms to recover from the economic crisis of 2001 and continued to further strengthen the local governments while enhancing its political grip over them. Yet, the labor market policies pursued (including precarization of the middle classes), along with the urban rent-based economic recovery program, exacerbated social and spatial inequalities, furthering the alienation process of the populations living in metropolitan Turkish cities (Penpecioglu et al., 2022; Türkün, 2014).

However, the central government in this period relied on effective political discourse, such as “majority,” “stability,” and “growth.” These discourses, in fact, reflect the concerns of and target an urban population suffering from the institutionalized uncertainty of neoliberalism. Hence, on the part of the electorate from different class backgrounds, a pure pragmatic concern with saving the day and thus their need for stability to survive under the uncertainties of neoliberalism (Simone & Rao, 2012) could be seen as a key factor in throwing their support behind the central government.

As a crisis containment strategy suppressing class conflicts and radical political mobilizations, some “divide and rule tactics” (through selective employment of consent-coercion mechanisms and through the redefinition of the formal-informal divide) have been used by the central government in the formation and implementation of neoliberal urban policies/projects (Penpecioglu, 2013). For instance, in the implementation of urban transformation projects, “growth”-oriented neoliberal hegemonic discourses are used to mobilize the consent of large sections of civil society. Most politicians and mayors, investors, and property developers subscribe to “development” and “investment”-based discourses. These discursive practices help them institutionalize a neoliberal hegemonic power over the formation of urban policies between 2002 and 2012 (Penpecioglu, 2013; Türkün, 2011).

What is more, several new laws and changes to existing laws are also used as coercive instruments of state power to bypass and overcome opposition against these projects. These laws included, but were not limited to, Law No. 5216 (Metropolitan Municipalities), Law No. 5393 (Municipalities, 2005), Law No. 5366 (Transformation of Dilapidated Real Estate of Historical and Cultural Value), and Law No. 5104 (North Ankara Urban Transformation Law), as well as various changes to Law No. 3194 (Development Law) and Law No. 6385 (Mass Housing Administration Law).

This selective use of legal coercive instruments, in fact, has been made possible and indeed amounted to redefining the boundaries between the legal and the illegal and between the formal and the informal. For example, the law on the transformation of the areas under disaster risk (Law No. 6306) passed to facilitate urban transformation projects creates a formal/legal pressure on those unwilling to vacate their apartments, stating that securing the approval of two-thirds of the apartment owners would suffice to demolish the building. Moreover, only to bypass the resistance from the district municipality in the implementation of a specific urban transformation project, Article 73 in the municipality law was amended. In yet another case, the master plan of Istanbul was ignored altogether to build the third bridge over the Bosphorus (while such an intervention inevitably

renders the plan—as an official document—dead). Such instances indicate how formal/legal frameworks (laws, master plans, etc.) are quickly bypassed and labeled as ex-legal conditions (having no validity) by the central government to sustain neoliberal urbanization in this period (Kahraman, 2021).

This period between 2002 and 2010 witnessed great changes in Turkish cities. However, towards the end of the period, it became obvious that not all ordinary people would benefit from neoliberal urbanization processes and that there would be losers as well as winners. Profit-driven urban transformation projects failed in most of the metropolitan cities, and it became difficult to generate rent as development extended further into the urban periphery (Bayırbağ et al., 2022). The limits of neoliberal urbanization were apparent in Türkiye, especially after the Gezi protests became a countrywide social unrest in 2013. Although it did not completely change the existing/dominant politics of representation, it became a serious and first sign of the collapse in urban crisis containment strategies (Bayırbağ & Penpecioglu, 2017).

The last signs indicating the total collapse of neoliberal urbanization were the Kahramanmaraş earthquakes in 2023. This devastating earthquake added physical destruction to the multiple (economic, social, political) crises of Türkiye. This huge disaster, unprecedented in the history of the country, is likely to have long-term consequences that deepen the already existing multiple crises. Contrary to the expectations that were created by oppositional political actors, the authoritarian political power holders-networks won the 2023 general elections, and they continue to dominate the operation of the central government in Türkiye. Although it seems that there is political stability in the country currently, it is very difficult to argue that the multiple forms of urban crises are contained. The remarkable results of the 2024 local elections revealed the central government's failure of neoliberal crisis containment strategies and marked the success of the main opposition party. In the upcoming years, it might be possible to observe renewed social policies and poverty alleviation strategies by some municipalities to cope with the destructive effects of the urban crisis.

CONCLUSION

Concluding Remarks and The Future Lines of Comparative Urban Studies

The article has two aims: (1) to discuss the reasons behind and consequences of the urban crises experienced in the two cases of the global South and Türkiye, and in that regard, (2) to investigate the logic(s) of variation across different instances of urban crises in the cases examined. We elaborated on these issues through a comparative

analysis of the cases of Egypt, India, and Türkiye. The article draws on Robinson's (2022) comparative methodological approach ("thinking with elsewhere") in urban policy, and the cases were selected on the bases/nature of the urban crises experienced.

Regarding the former aim, we emphasized that the political-economic development and urbanization processes of such countries have been shaped around a major political project, that of nation-state building. This unfinished project, which has involved the hard task of constructing social and territorial cohesion, was caught off-guard by the destabilizing effects of economic globalization in socio-political terms. The neoliberal policies introduced and the resultant processes of urbanization have further deepened the social and territorial divides while capitalizing upon and institutionalizing the uncertainties inherent in this unfinished project. This institutionalization process, across all three cases, has worked through a constant effort to redraw the boundaries between the formal and the informal, and between the legal and the illegal. This effort could be seen as the underlying logic of the containment strategies employed by the public authorities to keep potential unrest/dissent produced by the processes of neoliberal urbanization in check. This process, we argue, has been coupled with the selective employment of consent and coercion strategies, addressing different classes (or class fractions)/social groups differently through divide-and-rule tactics.

In certain contexts, those tactics have been more effective than in others. The degree of effectiveness of the containment strategies in general, and the divide-and-rule tactics in particular, have been determined by three factors: (1) the spatio-institutional design of the urban policy-making mechanisms; (2) the historical pattern of urbanization; and (3) the role of the nation-state (especially the central government) in the politics of (re)distribution, i.e., the struggles among different social classes/groups about access to (or exclusion from) resources needed in the production of material wealth and socially produced (surplus) value. These three factors also constitute a powerful analytical framework for the future lines of comparative urban studies.

We identified four different axes of struggle (possession/dispossession, exploitation, commons, representation) and indicated that the logic of variation across our cases has been determined by the public authorities' success/failure in managing these different domains of struggle, which have gotten increasingly tense under neoliberal policies and processes of urbanization. Especially in that regard, the public authorities' success/failure in pitting the middle class against the urban poor (and in pitting different sections of the middle class against each other) in these domains has emerged as the distinguishing aspect of those different cases.

NOTES

¹India's central and local policy-making processes and their inherited historical and ideological-cultural dynamics have some remarkable differences when compared to other two countries elaborated in the article. Although the years between 1951 and 1977, Indian National Congress Party ruled the country, the 1990s saw the end of single-party domination and the rise of coalition governments, which was quite similar to Türkiye. After the elections in 2019, the Hindu Nationalist Party (Bharatiya Janata Party) forms the government currently in the country. The widening support behind this party has its roots, partly in the public's discontent with the destructive consequences of past neoliberal policies in the country.

²After the military coup in 2013, the political power has changed dramatically in Egypt and a republican semi-presidential system was created under the dominance of Morsi government. Despite a political-ideological change in government, it is possible to observe striking continuities in the key urban policy-making processes of Morsi (current) and Mubarak (previous) governments. Morsi government does not adopt an aggressive policy towards to the elimination of informal urbanization. Despite the significant change in the national politics, Morsi government's does not implement an aggressive policy to eliminate informal urbanization.

³The dominant political trends in Türkiye indicate a unique combination of conservative identity politics and neoliberal economic programs took its roots from this period in the second part of 1990s. It should be noted that Welfare Party and its municipal power and practices in the 1990s provided a key government logic for Justice and Development Party in the upcoming years of Türkiye.

ETHICS: There are no ethical issues with the publication of this manuscript.

PEER-REVIEW: Externally peer-reviewed.

CONFLICT OF INTEREST: The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE: "3.3 The Case of Türkiye", a subsection in the article, based on the findings of an international research project (entitled Turkey's urbanization-led development strategy: impacts and manifestations in Ankara) funded by British Academy Newton Advanced Fund (NAF2R2\100172).

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